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I. INTRODUCTION

Same-sex couples who entered into marriage, or marriage-like
relationships in states that recognize such relationships, have been
denied divorce or dissolution of those relationships by other states.
These states refuse to recognize same-sex marriages, or their cognates,
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on constitutional or statutory grounds generally for want of
jurisdiction.' This Article argues that all such denials are
unconstitutional. The argument is based on a doctrinal trifecta
anchored by the law of three cases: Williams v. North Carolina,2
which deconstructed marriage; 3 Boddie v. Connecticut,4 which swept
away impediments to court access in family law matters, particularly
divorce, where the state retains a monopoly on dissolution of a
fundamental relationship; 5 and Hughes v. Fetter,6 which required
states to open their courts to narrowly similar juridical analogues from
other states pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.7 Importantly,
Justice Black identified "the national policy of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause" in Hughes, a meta-policy that informs the Clause and
controls its meaning and application beyond the micro-issues of
enforcement, 8 which restricts application of the Federal Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA") 9 in these circumstances.
Consider the following hypothetical: suppose two same-sex
partners enter into a marriage or marriage-like relationship allowed in
the state where they currently reside, then move to another state where
they decide to get divorced; they discover, however, that they have
relocated to a hostile forum state whose courts will not entertain an
action for divorce or dissolution of a same-sex union. They may want
out of their relationship for any number of reasons, including: a desire
to be free of the legal obligations attendant to the status of the
relationship; a desire to contract a marriage in the forum or elsewhere,
as in the instance of a bisexual person who falls in love with a person
of the opposite sex whom he or she wants to marry; or one partner
1. See infra Part II.
2. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
3. Id.
4. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
5. Id.
6. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
7. Id. at 611 ("[A state cannot escape its] constitutional obligation to enforce
the rights and duties validly created under the laws of other states by the simple
device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent."); See U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1.
8. Hughes, 341 U.S. at 613.
9. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
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wants to contract another same-sex union in a state that allows this.

The consequences are significant if partners in a same-sex relationship

are unable to divorce or otherwise dissolve their union. Remarrying
without first severing the same-sex relationship could subject the
partners to charges of bigamy in the state where they first contracted
their relationship, as well as other states recognize that relationship,
and adultery if such laws are enforced. It can be argued that anti-gay
hostility could increase the likelihood of selective enforcement of
these laws against gay and lesbian partners in some jurisdictions. In
any event, divorce and dissolution offer the only effective prospects
for clearing the legal decks for a legally uncomplicated future union.
In two recent cases from Indiana and Rhode Island, same-sex
partners whose relationships'o were solemnized in certain states were
unable to dissolve these relationships elsewhere."' This Article posits
that those refusals, irrespective of the courts' proffered bases, are
unconstitutional. This argument is based on the doctrinal trifecta
anchored by the law of Williams, Boddie, and Hughes. Each run of
this trifecta is a necessary, but in and of itself insufficient, part of this
argument.12 I propose, however, that taken together these three
constitutional doctrinal strands knit together to create an obligation to
dissolve same-sex unions contracted in other states. This is true
despite forum non-recognition policies and irrespective of whether
they are based on public policy, or state constitutional or statutory
restraints. 13 Further, DOMA does not affect this obligation.

10. See the useful taxonomy suggested by Hillel Y. Levin in his article
contained in this publication. Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving Interstate Conflicts Over
Marriage, Marriage-Like and Marriage-Lite Relationships, 41 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
93 (2010)
11. Order on Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, In re the Marriage of Tara
Ranzy and Larissa Chism, No. 49DI2-0903-DR-014654 (Ind. Super. Ct., Sept. 4,
2009) [hereinafter Ranzy and Chism]; Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I.
2007). Cf C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (granting the
divorce of a Massachusetts same-sex couple).
12. I later waffle a bit on whether, in fact, I have to win all three races in my
discussion following Boddie. See infra Part III.C.
13. See L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and
Same-Sex "Marriage":How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 42-44 (1998).
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BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Unsuccessful efforts to secure divorce or dissolution of same-sex
relationships legalized in other states have failed on questions of
jurisdiction-either for want of express statutory authorization, an
express bar in a state constitution, or statutes that make such
relationships void or legally uncognizable. For example, a recent
Texas case, In re the Matter of Marriageof J.B and H.B.,14 held that
"Texas courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a
divorce petition in the context of a same-sex marriage."' 5 As a result,
partners in a same-sex marriage celebrated in Massachusetts were
denied a Texas divorce. Similarly, an Indiana Superior Court
considered a request for the dissolution of a same-sex marriage by
parties who were legally married in Toronto, Canada, where same-sex
marriage was legally sanctioned. 16 The ground asserted for the
dissolution was "an irretrievable breakdown in the marriage."' 7 There
were no children to consider, and no real or personal property nor
debts to divide.18 The court denied the divorce because the parties
were lesbians.19 It concluded that in the absence of a statute, "which
confers upon the courts the authority to dissolve same sex marriages
in the same manner as marriages between a man and a woman," that it
lacked "subject matter jurisdiction." 20 The court further noted, in a
previous case, that under Indiana law "same-gender marriage is void
in Indiana even if it was valid in the place in which it was
solemnized." 2 1 Indiana has a state variant of DOMA that prohibits
homosexual marriage: "Sec. 1. (a) Only a female may marry a male.
Only a male may marry a female. (b) A marriage between persons of
the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the

14. No. 05-09-01170-CV, 2010 WL 3399074 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2010).
15. Id. at *9.
16. Ranzy and Chism, supra note 11.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Id.
21. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App., 2005) (citing
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-l1 -1-1(b) (West 2008)) (rejecting a state constitutional attack
on Indiana's variant of DOMA).
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place where it is solemnized."2 2 In weighing the policy behind the
statute, the court notes that:
[a]s the State of Indiana has chosen to prohibit same sex marriage
as a matter of public policy, it might logically follow that Indiana
would have a policy interest in granting same sex divorce.
However, the General Assembly has not enacted a statute which
confers upon the courts the authority to dissolve same sex
marriages in the same manner as marriages between a man and a
woman.23
Similarly, in the Connecticut case Rosengarten v. Downes,24 the
parties sought to dissolve a civil union contracted and legally
recognized in Vermont. 25 The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and affirmed a lower court's
dismissal of the action. 26
III. RUNS OF THE DOCTRINAL TRIFECTA

The three doctrinal strands that knit together to anchor the right to
dissolve same-sex relationships recognized out-of-state, but not
recognized by the forum where divorce or dissolution is sought, are
separated by time and pedigree. This doubtlessly inhibits recognition
of the right argued for here. For example, casebook editors question
whether the full faith and credit principle of Hughes requires state
courts to entertain domiciliaries' petitions for dissolution of these
relationships.2 7 The short answer is that Hughes alone cannot do the
doctrinal heavy lifting required because divorce and dissolution of
same-sex relationships are insufficiently analogous to wrongful death
suits, which was the subject of Hughes.2 8 However, what will be
apparent from the ensuing analysis is that, in separate doctrinal strands
22. IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008).
23. Ranzy and Chism, supra note 11, at 2-3.
24. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), appeal dismissed, 806 A.2d 1066
(Conn. 2002).
25. Id. at 172.
26. Id. at 184.
27. E.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS 618 (8th ed. West 2010).

28. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609-10 (1951).
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(the runs of the trifecta), the United States Supreme Court has
hollowed out the marital union to the point where, for purposes of
divorce, marriages and same-sex unions recognized by a state must
stand on an equal footing for full faith and credit purposes as defined
by Hughes. When all three races of the trifecta are run and analyzed,
the legal implications of Williams, Boddie, and Hughes are cleardivorce or dissolution of a same-sex relationship cannot be denied. As
will be explored below, this right is limited to issues of marital status
only.29 Hughes preserves separate issues governed by local law for the
forum. Ancillary issues of the relationship that can be resolved
separate and apart from the status issue-such as alimony, property,
and child custody-may be denied jurisdiction.3 0
A. Williams v. North Carolina
The first run of the doctrinal trifecta was accomplished around
fifty years ago, beginning with the constitutional emergence of the
concept of ex parte divorce in Williams.31 Williams began a legal
deconstruction of marriage in earnest. Marriage previously existed as
a congeries of interests including, but not limited to, legally
sanctioned sexual congress, financial support obligations that included
spouses and children, property interests, and special interests in the
nurture and upbringing of children. As a result of Williams, marriage
began to disentangle into separable elements.32 An important aspect of
that disentanglement was the exclusivity of the relationship fortified
by restrictions on contracting another such relationship until the first
was legally dissolved.3 3 Other interests also disaggregated on the
strength of the Williams principle. For example, in Estin v. Estin34 the
Court held that a New York award for maintenance and support
survived a Nevada ex parte divorce. 35 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt36
29. Marital Status is "[the] condition of being single, married, legally
separated, divorced, or widowed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1054 (9th ed. 2004).

30. See infra Part III.C.
31. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
32. Id. at 298-99.
33. See id. at 300.
34. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
35. Id. at 546 (holding an exparte divorce decree does not change "every legal
incidence of the marriage relationship.").
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arguably went further by sustaining a New York alimony award to a
wife even though the husband previously procured an ex parte divorce
in Nevada.3 7 May v. Anderson3 8 extended the deconstruction of
marriage by disaggregating child custody from divorce. 39 The effect of
these various steps was to legally hollow out divorce to the point
where, at its minimum, it only concerns status-the persistence vel
non of a state-recognized status (i.e., whether one is single, married,
divorced, or widowed). Laws preclude individuals from entering into
another relationship until the preceding one is dissolved-a restriction
that is reinforced by laws against adultery 40 and bigamy. 4 1
An important contribution to the Williams run is provided by
Lawrence v. Texas, 42 which invalidated state regulation of homosexual
conduct.4 3 Lawrence, however, affected more than just the rights of
homosexual persons. It fundamentally undermined reliance on
morality as a predicate for limiting lawful sexual activity to
marriage. 44 Justice Marshall explained the pre-Lawrence state of the
law in his opinion for the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail45: marriage is
"the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual

36. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
37. Id. at 418-19.
38. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
39. Id. at 528-29.
40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2007) ("A married person commits
the offense of adultery when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with a person
other than his spouse . . . .").

41. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20(a) (2007) ("A person commits the
offense of bigamy when he, being married and knowing that his lawful spouse is
living, marries another person or carries on a bigamous cohabitation with another
person.").
42. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
43. Id. at 579 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute, which made it a crime for
two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct, was
unconstitutional).
44. Id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("State laws against bigamy, same-sex
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws
based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by
today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to
exclude them from its holding.").
45. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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relations legally to take place."4 6 That all changed with the decision in
Lawrence. The validation of non-marital sexual relations by
homosexuals was similarly extended to consenting heterosexuals, so
long as minors, coercion, commercialization, and public indecency are
not involved.47
The impact of Lawrence on marriage-related laws, such as
adultery and bigamy laws remains unclear. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion in Lawrence expressly disclaimed any involvement
in marriage matters-"[Lawrence] does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter." 48
A facile reading of Justice Kennedy's words might suggest that
Lawrence leaves same-sex marriages and similar relationships
untouched. However, a close reading of Justice Kennedy's disclaimer,
in fact, seems narrowly focused on entry into relationships;i.e., states
will not be forced to accommodate same-sex marriages or their
cognates by allowing them to occur when they do not wish to do so.
Lawrence says nothing about divorce or dissolution of same-sex
relationships that already exist. 49
If I am correct, the impact of Lawrence on marriage is profound
because it severed the link between sexual morality and marriage. It
effectively ended the hegemony that marriage existed as a privileged
legal sanctuary for engaging in sexual relations,50 and deconstructed
the state regulation of sexual acts on moral grounds. Justice Scalia's
hyperbolic assessment of the impact of Lawrence reinforces this
conclusion: "[State] laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity are . .. sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of

laws based on moral choices." 5 One need not concede all of the
46. Id. at 386 (1978).
47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("[Lawrence] does not involve minors. It does
not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution.").
48. Id.
49. See id
50. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 ("[Marriage is] the only relationship in
which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.").
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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implications suggested by Justice Scalia in order to agree with him
that morality as a basis for regulating sexual conduct ended with the
decision in Lawrence, and that fornication laws applicable to adults
are no longer constitutionally valid.5 2 The marriage hegemony over
sex has ended.
Laws aimed at protecting the institution of marriage, like those
proscribing adultery and bigamy, may survive Lawrence. However, I
will argue below that this only adds force to the argument that states
may not refuse to dissolve same-sex relationships on a basis
comparable to those wishing to escape heterosexual marriages.
The cumulative impact of these post-Williams cases was that
aspects of a marriage other than status could be resolved separate and
apart from the status issue. Once the jurisdictional exclusivity of the
state of marital domicile ended, and the so-called suitcase divorce
legally legitimized, divorce could emerge as a minimalist change of
status-a reversion to an unmarried state with resolution of issues
around money, property, and offspring deferrable to another time in
potentially separate proceedings.
B. Boddie v. Connecticut
Although conventionally viewed as a "right to judicial process" or
"court access" case,5 3 Boddie cannot be understood apart from its core
issue-marriage and divorce. 54 This legal nub is derived from a
congeries of substantive due process and equal protection interests
that comprise the right of personal, associational, sexual, marital, and
family privacy; a number of cases define such rights. 5 Boddie
52. See L. Lynn Hogue, Romer Revisited or 'The Devil in the Details': Is
Georgia's Marriage Amendment Constitutionally Defective?, 7 FLA. COASTAL L.
REv. 255, 261 n.48 (2005) (stating that Lawrence recognized the right of adults to
engage in a range of sexual activity outside of marriage.).
53. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICS 881-84 (2d ed. 2002); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674-76 (7th ed. 2000).

54. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (upholding Roe's essential holding recognizing a woman's right to choose an
abortion before fetal viability); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a
state criminal law prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the
life of the mother is unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

9

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 10

238

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

involved a challenge by indigent welfare recipients who sought to file
divorce actions, but were unable to pay the required sixty dollars in
court fees and costs for service of process. 56 Justice Harlan wrote for
the majority and concluded that because of the State's
"monopolization of the means for legally dissolving [the marriage]
relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely
because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages."5 7 Although Justice Harlan's
due process rationale appears to be narrowly focused on financial
barriers to court access, the postulates he identified in support of his
claim are, as will be seen immediately below, equally applicable to
those in legally sanctioned same-sex relationships who seek
dissolution of those relationships in a hostile forum.
I
First, Justice Harlan notes that claims asserted by the appellants
were "akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes."58 Hence, the
applicable principles were those stated "in our due process decisions
that delimit rights of defendants compelled to litigate their differences
in the judicial forum." 59 Under one of the settled principles "due
process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state
interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims
of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard." 60 Justice Harlan signaled out two
factors to account for the particular application of due process in this
context: at issue is "the adjustment of a fundamental human
relationship" and "[t]he requirement that these appellants resort to the
judicial process is entirely a state-created matter." 61
Obviously, parties in a same-sex marriage or marriage analogue
entered into in another state are in much the same situation as the
indigents in Boddie who were trapped in a marriage by poverty. These

(holding that a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives is unconstitutional
because it invades on marital people's rights to privacy).
56. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372.
57. Id. at 374.
58. Id. at 376.
59. Id. at 377.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 383.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol41/iss1/10

10

Hogue: The Constitutional Obligation to Adjudicate Petitions for Same-Se

2010]OBLIGATION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONS FOR SAME-SEX

DIVORCE 239

parties seek divorce or dissolution from the only entity that can grant
it. Like the parties in Boddie, they meet all the requisites for divorce,
except one-the filing fee in the instance of Boddie, and an
acknowledgment of jurisdiction in the instance of same-sex marriages
entered into in another state. Cases of legal parity such as these, where
access to justice i s denied to claimants from the only legal forum
available to them, raise similar due process concerns.6 2
The Supreme Court has refused to expand Boddie into a broad
doctrine of constitutional limits on financial barriers to justice as an
elaboration of due process or equal protection rights.6 3 Nonetheless,
the Court carefully preserves Boddie's principle that a state cannot
impose barriers to divorce or dissolution of state-sanctioned
relationships that only a state can dissolve. In distinguishing divorce
from other cases in which the Court upheld court fees against
constitutional challenges, the Court has adhered to the view that
marriage and divorce involve constitutionally distinct, fundamental
interests. For example, in United States v. Kras,6 4 which involved a
challenge to a fifty-dollar fee required to secure discharge in
bankruptcy, 65 the Court distinguished Boddie by holding that interest
in discharging debt in bankruptcy "[did] not rise to the same
constitutional level" as the interest in establishing or dissolving a
marriage.66
In fact, the Court has singled out family law and domestic
relations cases as a distinguishable subset that must be judged by a
62. No argument is put forth here that divorce or dissolution of a prior legally
sanctioned relationship is a fundamental right, such as marriage itself. See Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). Logically, if the state is limited in imposing
barriers to marriage because of marriage's fundamental nature, then it would seem
that capricious refusals of divorce or dissolution (as in Boddie or Zablocki), which
impose barriers to remarriage, would be problematic. Therefore, I need not argue
that divorce itself is in any way fundamental or a correlate to marriage in that way.
63. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 441-46 (1973). As this article was
being prepared a lower federal court in California held marriage to be a fundamental
right. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-95 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Should this ruling be upheld on appeal, a right of same-sex persons to divorce would
rest on an alternative and more constitutionally robust foundation than is argued
here.
64. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
65. Id. at 434.
66. Id. at 445.
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stricter standard of review because of the fundamental character of the
interest involved. 67 Therefore, refusals by the states to divorce samesex couples or to dissolve their relationships cannot survive
heightened scrutiny.
An important case that preserved and reemphasized Boddie's
principle is ML.B. v. S.L.J.,6 8 which held that a state could not require
a trial record preparation fee as a predicate to an appeal involving
termination of a child-custody award.6 9 Justice Ginsburg placed
ML.B. within a spectrum of cases representing that the special status
of marriage and divorce "reflect both equal protection and due process
concems." 70 In her majority opinion for the Court, she stated:
[T]ellingly, the Court has consistently set apart from the mine run
of cases those involving state controls or intrusions on family
relationships. In that domain, to guard against undue official
intrusion, the Court has examined closely and contextually the
importance of the governmental interest advanced in defense of the
intrusion. 71
ML.B. provided a safe harbor for domestic relations cases,
including divorce cases, for which state restrictions face a more
exacting standard of review than mere rationality. 72 Boddie is unique
because it concerned "the special nature of the marital relationship and
its concomitant associational interests." 73
Note that the constitutional obligation for which I contend is
limited to cases in which the parties seeking divorce or dissolution
otherwise comply with all other state-imposed predicates for divorce,
such as residence and fee requirements, unless they meet Boddie's
indigency standard. Therefore, these cases are like cases of
67. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 104-05 (1996).
68. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
69. Id. at 119-20, 128.
70. Id. at 130 ("[T]he Court's decisions concerning access to judicial
processes, commencing with Griffin [v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),] and running
through Mayer [v. City of Chi., 404 U.S. 189 (1971)], reflect both equal protection
and due process concerns.").
71. Id. at 116.
72. Id. at 116-17. See also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
73. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658 (1973). See also Kras, 409 U.S. at
441-42.
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heterosexual divorce petitioners in the forum, but the state still refuses
to take jurisdiction.
Relief from this circumstance comes from the third run of my
doctrinal trifecta-the Full Faith and Credit Clause-as it was
interpreted and applied in Hughes.74
C. Hughes v. Fetter
I begin this subsection on a personal note. One person, whose
views I respect, who heard an earlier version of this paper, suggested
that my case could perhaps be made even better without resort to
Hughes. Certainly, Hughes has its detractors and is not cited often.
However, four Supreme Court Justices agreed with Justice Black in
Hughes, so I believe it worthy of serious attention. Thus, I preserve
this piece of my analysis, both because I believe it strengthens my
argument and, after teaching Hughes in my Conflict of Laws classes
for over twenty five years, I have come to believe the case is more
than merely a sport in the law. Instead, I believe it represents a
fundamental principle of full faith and credit jurisprudence that has
unique application to this problem.
Hughes is a minimalist case-sparse in both pedigree and
progeny. Its sparse pedigree is evident in the fact that it is not based
on the text, history, structure, or practice of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, but rather on what Justice Black called "the national policy"
of the clause.7 5 In Hughes, Justice Black described a legal world
created by the Full Faith and Credit Clause in which states have a
mutual "obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created
under the laws of other states." 76 Elsewhere, he described this
obligation as "the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state
of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of
sister states."7 7
74. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
75. Id. at 613.
76. Id. at 611.
77. Id. at 612. Justice Black traces this principle to MagnoliaPetroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943), which stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
"altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each
free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the
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The Court in Hughes held that a Wisconsin statutory policy
disallowing wrongful death causes of action brought under another
state's laws was "forbidden by the national policy of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause."7 8 Wisconsin breached its obligation by closing its
courts to causes of action for wrongful death based on the analogous
laws of sister states. 79 Wisconsin regulated jurisdiction by confining it
to actions "brought for a death caused in this state."80 The trial court
in Hughes dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the merits holding that
the Wisconsin wrongful death statute established "a local public
policy against Wisconsin's entertaining suits brought under the
wrongful death acts of other states."81
A close reading of Justice Black's basis for invalidating the
Wisconsin law demonstrates why that principle is equally applicable
to actions for dissolution of same-sex unions in states hostile to such
actions. First, Wisconsin had "no real feeling of antagonism against
wrongful death suits in general. To the contrary, a forum [was]
regularly provided for cases of this nature, the exclusionary rule
judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation
.

. . ."

Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612 n.9. Within the confines of the issue of whether

workers' compensation awards are entitled to full faith and credit, Magnolia's
constitutional status has long been clouded by a later decision, Indus. Comm 'n of
Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947), which purported to distinguish, but did not
overrule Magnolia. In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980),
the Court revisited the issue of finality of workers' compensation awards, but was
unable to muster five votes to overrule either Magnolia or McCartin. A dissenting
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Marshall, describes the Court's
apparent confusion as follows: "[S]ix of us agree that [McCartin is] analytically
indefensible. The remaining three Members of the Court concede that it 'rest[s] on
questionable foundations.' Nevertheless, when the smoke clears, it is Magnolia
rather than McCartin that the plurality suggests should be overruled." Thomas, 448
U.S. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Two points are important
here. First, Magnolia remains good law because the Court in Thomas was unwilling
to disturb it. Second, Magnolia, on its facts, deals narrowly with full faith and credit
to administrative tribunal awards (workers' compensation awards); so, Justice
Black's citation of Magnolia for recognition of a "unifying principle embodied in
the Full Faith and Credit Clause" applicable to statutorily created rights, as opposed
to those based on judgments or judgment-like awards, retains all of its force.
Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612.
78. Hughes, 341 U.S. at 613.
79. Id. at 612-13.
80. Id. at 610 n.2 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 610.
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extending only so far as to bar actions for death not caused locally." 8 2
The state's "local public policy" was a constitutionally insufficient
ground for refusing to hear the case. 83 Second, all the parties were
residents of Wisconsin. 84 Finally, Justice Black made it clear that
although states may not refuse jurisdiction over claims based on
foreign law in violation of local public policy, the forum may
nonetheless apply its own substantive law to other issues in the case.
As applied to an action for dissolution of a same-sex union not
recognized by the forum, this would mean that there is a constitutional
obligation to provide for dissolution of the relationship on the same
basis that divorce is provided for married couples. However, there is
no obligation to resolve collateral issues concerning property, support,
or child custody issues. 86 It is thus my contention that the Constitution
only trumps non-recognition laws to the extent that they deny access
,to divorce or dissolution for individuals in same-sex marriages, or
analogous relationships, that were legally created by foreign law.

82. Id. at 612 (footnotes omitted).
83. Id. at 612-13.
84. Id. at 613. Residence of at least one party is routinely required of parties
seeking a divorce. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2320 (LexisNexis 2006) ("A
judgment of dissolution of marriage may not be entered unless one of the parties to
the marriage has been a resident of this state for six months and of the county in
which the proceeding is filed for three months next preceding the filing of the
petition."); FLA. STAT. § 61.021 (2009) ("To obtain a dissolution of marriage, one of
the parties to the marriage must reside 6 months in the state before the filing of the
petition."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (2009) ("The plaintiff shall set forth in his or her
complaint that the complainant or defendant has been a resident of the State of North
Carolina for at least six months next preceding the filing of the complaint .... ).
85. Id. at 612 n.10. "The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having
entertained appellant's lawsuit, chose to apply its own instead of Illinois' statute to
measure the substantive rights involved." Id.
86. Gillian Metzger offers an illustration:
Nor is it difficult to envision instances when an individual might
sue to enforce a judgment that involves a same-sex marriage-for
example, a judgment that an insurer is liable to cover the costs of
medical procedures under a health insurance policy covering
spouses. DOMA's Section 2 clearly allows states to refuse to
recognize judgments of this sort ....
Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARv. L.
REV. 1468, 1534-35 (2007).
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All states and the District of Columbia allow for divorce." State
laws may impose restrictions on the availability of divorce by
determining the grounds for divorce and setting residence
requirements, even stringent and exacting ones as in Sosna v. Iowa, 88
which upheld a one-year residency requirement for divorce. 89
However, if same-sex petitioners satisfy these prerequisites for
divorce, then, under Hughes, the Constitution compels the dissolution
of an analogous relationship.
It is important to recognize that Hughes, by requiring the exercise
of jurisdiction where state laws exhibit closely analogical policies, did
not suggest an exception to the ordinary rule that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause applies to judgments and not statutes.90 Nor did Hughes
require recognition of a foreign statute, at least not for any significant
purpose. Consultation of foreign law is limited to determining whether
the parties were legally joined in a union under another state's law.
The question again is parity. Is this couple otherwise like couples
married in other states in conformity with their law? What Hughes did
mandate was respect for a policy common to both states of divorce or
dissolution of marriage-like or marriage-lite unions on the same basis
accorded to marriages under the "the national policy of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause."9 1 Non-recognition with respect to foreign
87. See Legal Information Institute, Divorce Laws, CORNELL U. L. SCH.,
http://topics.law.comell.edu/wex/table divorce (last visited Aug. 11, 2010) (listing
the state divorce statutes of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico).
88. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
89. Id. at 406-08.
90. Compare Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294
U.S. 532 (1935), and Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal.,
306 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1939) (holding preclusive jurisdiction provided in workers'
compensation statutes was not entitled to full faith and credit), with Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1908) (ruling a conclusive judgment in Missouri was
due full faith and credit in Mississippi).
91. Justice Black enumerated the circumstances in Hughes that forbid
Wisconsin, the hostile forum in that case, from denying jurisdiction to the wrongful
death action that occurred in Illinois. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1951).
There was (1) no antagonism or hostility to this type of cause of action; (2) no claim
that this is an exercise of the doctrine of forum non conveniens (nor any possibility
that such a claim could be credibly asserted under the facts of the case); (3) no case
involving nonresident parties or a cause of action with which the state lacked any
connection (no disinterested forum); and, (4) no reasonable prospect that the parties
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marriage judgments, or even foreign marriage, marriage-like, or
marriage-lite statutes, is not at issue.9 2
IV. FATHOMING DOMA's ROLE
This phase of my analysis assumes the validity of DOMA.9 3 As
this article was being prepared for publication, a federal district court
in Massachusetts concluded that DOMA violated equal protection
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
and was therefore unconstitutional.94 Whether appellate courts will
accept this reasoning remains to be seen. If DOMA is constitutionally
infirm, 95 then of course it plays no role. Gillian Metzger, a
constitutional defender, concluded that if yet-to-be recognized
constitutional objections relating to same-sex marriage 96 are properly

could resolve their dispute elsewhere. Id. These triggering factors are also present in
actions by same-sex partners who seek divorce in a hostile forum. Jurisdictional
denials in such cases should likewise be "forbidden by the national policy of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause." Id. at 613.
92. See Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Creditfor Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 465, 475 n.48 (2005) (citations omitted).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) ("No state, territory, or possession of the United
States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising
from such relationship.")
94. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
95. See Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604 (1997)
(arguing that DOMA is unconstitutional); Andrew Koppelman, Interstate
Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L. J.
1265 (2004); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. REV. 1965 (1997).
Chabora's conclusions are challenged. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage
Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 255, 377-79 (1998). Kramer's position has also been
contested. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for
InterjurisdictionalRecognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 147, 153-54, 167-71 (1998) (disputing Kramer's public policy argument);
Whitten, supra, at 372-75 (evaluating Kramer's historical references). Chabora's
conclusions are challenged. See Whitten, supra, at 377-79.
96. "The fact that same-sex marriage is involved may be an unconstitutional
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bracketed then "DOMA's Section 2 appears to fall within
congressional power." 97
DOMA purports to relieve states and similar entities from any
obligation to recognize any form of legalization of a same-sex
relationship (marriage, marriage-like, or marriage-lite) from another
state or similar entity.9 8 States have also adopted anti-recognition
statutes. 99 The enforcement provision in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause' 00 is limited textually to what I would term micro-issues of
enforcement. 1 0 ' Congress is not obligated to further enforce the
clause, although it can and has done so.' 02 However, Congress cannot
abrogate what Justice Black called, "the national policy of the Full
basis for denying a judgment's enforcement, either because it constitutes invidious
discrimination against homosexuals or because it violates the fundamental right to
marry." Metzger, supra note 86, at 1536.
97. Id.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
99. See, e.g., Georgia's anti-recognition statute which provides:
(a) It is declared to be the policy of this state to recognize the union only
of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are
prohibited in this state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as
entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons
of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or
foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual
rights granted by virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the courts
of this state and the courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction
whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a divorce or separate
maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule
on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in
connection with such marriage.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2007). Furthermore, Georgia law provides: "No
marriage license shall be issued to persons of the same sex." GA. CODE. ANN. § 193-30(b)(1) (2007).
100. "Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1.
101. What I refer to as the micro-issues of enforcement regarding the Full
Faith and Credit Clause are treated extensively by Engdahl and Sachs. See David E.
Engdahl, The ClassicRule ofFaith and Credit, 118 YALE L. J. 1584 (2009); Stephen
E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REv. 1201 (2009).
102. Literature on the Full Faith and Credit Clause is voluminous. See, e.g.,
Whitten, supra note 255.
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Faith and Credit Clause"' 03 (the meta-policy that informs the clause
and controls its meaning and application beyond the micro-issues of
enforcement).1 04 What I refer to as micro-issues of enforcement derive
from the clause's textually prescribed role as a prima facie rule of
evidence. Its meta-policy, as articulated in Hughes, 0 5 assures that
parochial local policies do not facilely displace sparsely defined,
analogous causes of action. What Justice Black recognized in Hughes
is a self-enforcing meta-policy that states cannot avoid in instances
where a closely analogous law, whose basic underlying policy is
indistinguishable from forum policy, confronts the forum. This is the
case whether the law concerns actions for wrongful death or actions
for divorce or dissolution of a foreign union that would foreclose the
possibility of otherwise lawful marriage.
V. CONCLUSION

A gradual evolution in constitutional law has produced a doctrinal
trifecta anchored by the law of three cases: Williams, which
deconstructed marriage;' 06 Boddie, which recognized a right to
dissolve legal relationships constructed by states and which can only
be dissolved by state action for those, particularly residents, who
otherwise meet the requirements for divorce (assuming they sought
divorce from a traditional marriage);10 7 and Hughes, which required
states to open their courts to juridical analogues from other states by
force of the "national policy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 08
103. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951).
104. Cf Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Defense of MarriageAct of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REv. 604, 621 (1997)
(contending that a one-way ratchet operates with respect to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to limit Congress's power).
105. "This clause 'altered the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the
laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an
integral part of a single nation . . . .'" Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612 n.9 (quoting

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943)).
106. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
107. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
108. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Hughes, 341 U.S. at 611 (a state cannot escape
its "constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under
the laws of other states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts
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Together they provide a constitutional basis to require states, even in
the face of the Federal DOMA or state anti-recognition statutes and
policies, to grant dissolution of legally contracted, foreign same-sex
relationships.

otherwise competent.").
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